Last month we began the discussion about the relationship between combustion safety and uptime, highlighting how combustion safety, reliability, emissions, and efficiency are inseparable. This month, we will explore the subject in greater detail and outline a path that can both reduce the risk of an incident and protect the bottom line.
This article written by John Clarke, technical director at Helios Electric Corporation, appears in the annual Heat Treat Today 2021 Buyer's Guide June print edition. Return to our digital editions archive on Monday June 21, 2021 to access the entire print edition online!
Technical Director
Helios Electrical Corporation
Source: Helios Electrical Corporation
How many times have we heard the tale about the man with the leaky roof? He cannot fix his roof when it is raining, and the roof doesn’t need repaired when it is not. This story is also applicable to heating system maintenance, perhaps more so than other plant maintenance activities because it so seldom “rains.” Ovens and boilers tend to be very reliable. (This statement is true for equipment operating at low or moderate temperatures, less so for equipment operating above 1832°F (1000°C).) It is exactly when the machine is properly producing parts that the planning for combustion safety, availability, and performance must occur.
The first critical step we must take is to understand that combustion safety, routine maintenance, tuning, and calibration are parts of a larger work strategy. To focus solely on the annual inspection of safety components while ignoring system tuning will not only compromise tuning and efficiency, but also the safety. We have seen how managerial reactions to high profile incidents have caused some firms to dispatch teams to annually examine valves and pressure switches. This effort is highly compromised if it does not include all aspects of system maintenance as well as capturing what is learned each time to improve future inspections and equipment designs. There is data beyond pass and fail that is valuable if we wish to optimize the performance of our equipment
Let us assume it is a clear sunny day, and we are ready to invest some time in preparing to improve our combustion system starting with a deep dive examination of two pressure switches: the low fuel gas pressure switch (LFGPS) and high fuel gas pressure switch (HFGPS). These ubiquitous components are present on nearly every fuel train and are vital for safe operation. As their names imply, they monitor the fuel pressure and shut the safety valves if the fuel gas pressure is either too high or too low.
These switches must be listed for the service they provide by an agency independent of the manufacturer – UL, TUV, FM, etc. Simply looking for a stamp may not be enough; take the time to read the file or standard being applied by the agency and determine if it describes the application. Next, ask if the pressure switch carries the basic ratings expected, like the enclosure rating (Nema or IP). Is a Nema 1 switch operating in a Nema 12 area? Temperature ratings must be confirmed. All too often a component rated for 32°F (0°C) is applied in an outdoor environment in cold climates, or one with a maximum rating of 120°F (50°C) is applied next to the hot wall of a furnace. The component may operate out of specified environmental ranges for some time, but to apply a component in this manner is betting against the house – sooner are later we are going to lose. Ask the people of Texas if the bet against sustained cold temperatures in early 2021 was worth it.
"John Clarke, Technical Director, Helios Electrical The first critical step we must take is to understand that combustion safety, routine maintenance, tuning, and calibration are parts of a larger work strategy"
Next, let us look at the contact(s) rating of the switch and how it is applied to the burner management circuit. More often than not, these switches are in control circuits fused for more current than the contact rating. If the switch rating is too low, the electrical designer has an option to use an interposing relay to increase the current carrying capacity to this device. This relay is an added component, and as such, adds yet another possible point of failure. If the relay is interposed, is it dedicated to this one switch? Multiple devices being interposed by a single relay is prohibited by NFPA 86, for good reason. Is the relay designed to fail safely? That is, will a relay coil burn out or wiring fault close the critical safety valves? Is the wire gauge suitable for the current carried and protection device used?
Next, is the switch mounted in a safe location free from possible vibration or the foot of an eager furnace operator? If the switch must be changed, are clearances provided to perform this maintenance? What is the mean time to replace (MTTR) the component? Is the way the device is wired providing a path for combustible gas to enter the control enclosure and cause an explosion? Flexible conduit, without a means to seal the connection, is a very common error. Use a properly specified cord and consider using some type of connector to terminate the wiring at the switch. A simple 7/8-16 or DIN connector not only provides additional protection from combustion gas getting into the electrical conduit but is also a great benefit when changing the component in a rush and helps to isolate the component’s control circuit during testing and calibration.
Is the pressure switch suitably protected from bad “actors” in the fuel gas? Perhaps soot is present that could foul narrow passages or H2S that could result in corrosion. These are rare conditions, but coke oven gas may not be as clean as purchased natural gas. Do we need to specify stainless steel components? Would a filter make sense to protect the switch and increase the intervals between maintenance?
Finally, let’s discuss pressure ratings. Unfortunately, nomenclature varies by manufacturer. What is the maximum pressure the device can sustain and not fail, i.e., leak fuel gas into the environment? Many switches can experience a pressure surge without risk of leakage, but the high-pressure event will damage the switch internally. It is important when determining if this rating is adequate to consider possible failure modes that might expose the pressure switch to excessive pressure. As a rule of thumb, a pressure switch must be able to sustain a surge pressure delivered to the inlet of the pressure reducing regulator immediately upstream of the device. Think of it this way, if the upstream regulator experiences a failure, the full pressure delivered to this regulator will pass to the pressure switch in question.
Other obvious pressure ratings are the maximum and minimum set points. The pressure switch should be set to trip as close to the middle of the range as possible and should never be set close to either the minimum or maximum setpoint. Is the pressure switch manually or automatically reset after a trip? In general, it is best practice that the LFGPS resets automatically, and the HFGPS requires a reset by the operator. This recommendation is because LFGPS trips each time pressure is removed from the system, and it is generally understood that the system needs fuel to operate. On the other hand, a high-pressure event is exceedingly rare, and the operator should be made aware of this unusual event.
This article has discussed a lot about the simple pressure switch. It appears to be a heavy lift to perform this analysis on every pressure switch in a facility, but take comfort, once the exercise has been completed on the first system, it is much easier to replicate what has been learned to properly assess other systems. We should most definitely insist that our OEM provides this data, in detail, when new equipment is supplied. Why did we review all these specifications? Because I have been around for a while and have seen nearly every one of these errors in the application of pressure switches on operating combustion equipment.
Next month, we will expand on the pressure switch discussion to describe the tune/calibration and testing processes. I hope this deep and specific dive has been of value. If you have any questions or comments, please let me know.
About the Author:
John Clarke, with over 30 years in the heat processing area, is currently the technical director of Helios Corporation. John’s work includes system efficiency analysis, burner design as well as burner management systems. John was a former president of the Industrial Heating Equipment Association and vice president at Maxon Corporation.
